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1. Introduction
The purpose of this study was to explore how pilots po-
tentially learn from their and others’ experience through 
post-flight debriefing. Through a case study of pilots who 
fly air ambulances, this article attempts to illustrate the 
importance of “learning from experience” (Bion 1962) 
among pilots in aviation.
I have been working with pilots for 15 years and 
have been particularly interested in the psychological 
work pilots are faced with during flight operations. This 
study focuses on a pilot’s ability to handle emotions. 
Learning and change are two sides of the same coin, and 
the main issue in this study is to define how the evolve-
ment of airmanship in general and air ambulance oper-
ations in particular are intimately connected to a pilot’s 
ability to cope with his/her own emotions.
An air ambulance is an aircraft used for emergency 
medical assistance in situations where either a traditional 
ambulance cannot reach the scene easily or quickly 
enough, or the patient needs to be transported over a dis-
tance or terrain that makes air transportation necessary. 
Air ambulance aircrafts are supplied with equipment that 
enables them to provide medical treatment to a critically 
injured or ill patients. The crew in an air ambulance op-
eration consists of pilots and the medical staff. Pilots 
who operate ambulance aircraft are part of the medical 
operation and the medical staff is part of the flight crew. 
On the ground, pilots assist the onboard medical staff in 
boarding and offloading patients and their relatives.
Air ambulance pilots must have a great deal of ex-
perience in piloting their aircraft because the condi-
tions they face are often more challenging than regular 
non-emergency flights, as these pilots fly in extreme 
situations in which they simultaneously have to focus 
on being a good airman while constantly being relation-
ally adequate towards others onboard. From an integral 
perspective, pilots must also deal with emotions that are 
evoked through their close interaction with the patients 
and medical staff in the cabin.
In this paper, I use Bion’s theory of learning from 
experience to relate to the pilot’s daily working life. Based 
on the understanding of learning from experience, I 
want to explore the following question: what is the role 
of the post-flight debriefing in the parallel processes of 
becoming and being a good airman and the ability to 
contain one’s feelings?
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2. Method
The pilot’s story about the time the crew and he had a 
flight that contained operative as well as emotional chal-
lenges when a patient died during a flight is presented.
The analysis of the narrative used in this study was 
conducted from a psychoanalytical perspective in order 
to emphasize the continuous psychological work which 
seems to be necessary for a pilot to accommodate the 
ideals within the concept of what constitutes a good pilot 
in an air ambulance flight operation.
It is important to stress that the story is the pilot’s 
retrospective reconstruction of a flight. Using narratives 
is methodologically challenging, both from a validity 
and reliability point of view. Nevertheless, the story is 
interesting because it illustrates how the post-flight de-
briefings construct individual and collective emotional 
experiences. I have therefore chosen to present the case 
study in a narrative reconstructional form since this il-
lustrates the pilot’s personal development. I would like to 
stress that the purpose of the narrative was not to analyse 
the pilot as a person, but rather to understand the work 
of the pilot.
3. what is airmanship?
Airmanship is an indistinct concept that has no clear 
definition other than several descriptive and normative 
formulations which cover a broad range of desirable 
behaviours, attitudes, social, emotional and relational 
competences and abilities that an aviator must possess 
in addition to the competencies of operating the aircraft 
in a safe and efficient manner (Kern 1997, 1998; Lank-
ford, 1998; FAA 2004; DeMaria 2006). An integral part 
of being a good airman is to be a good crewmember, and 
being a good crewmember is an integral part of being 
an airman.
A pilot’s ability to communicate, cooperate and 
interact with others in order to understand, assess and 
solve problems, in addition to making decisions has 
been pinpointed by several researchers as being just as 
important as possessing cognitive and technical skills 
(Kern 1997, 1998; Franz et  al. 1990; Driskell, Adams 
1992; Helmreich et al. 1999; Hedge et al. 2000; Benison 
2000; Martinussen 2005).
The descriptions and normative conceptions of air-
manship have a lot in common with the definition of 
professionalism referred to by Haugsgjerd (1983, 1990). 
Within the everyday life of flight operations, pilots face 
the challenges of experiencing emotions and feelings 
alongside an ideal of being cooperative, communicative, 
assertively empathetic and stable; they must also be able 
to relate to symmetric interaction despite hierarchical 
differences while at the same time maintaining a mental 
state in which their emotions do not influence them in a 
negative way that can affect flight safety.
Pilots must sometimes display or actively deal with 
feelings differently than what they actually have the ca-
pacity to deal with since the daily life of a flight oper-
ation demands them to do so. The environment allows 
few openings for individual emotion, as the cockpit 
and cabin are first and foremost a practical setting. Pi-
lots and crew members must have the ability to think in 
bionic terms while controlling the aircraft, regardless of 
whether they are manually flying the aircraft or using 
the flight director and letting the autopilot do the steer-
ing. The pilots and flight crew must create safety in every 
flight through their practice (Dekker 2006; Antonsen 
et al. 2008). Pilots must manage the workload connected 
with the individual tasks in the flight operation. In addi-
tion, they must create and at all times potentially recon-
sider their mental picture of the flight and their planning 
process, allowing the crew to mentally be ahead of the 
aircraft: their thoughts must be in front of the aircraft, 
thereby giving them the ability to identify a potential 
problem and deal with it in order to avoid any hazardous 
or dangerous situations (Cannon-Bowers et al. 1993).
During the flight, there are many feelings and emo-
tions that the pilot cannot allow himself or others to feel. 
The pilot must have control over his feelings and not lose 
his composure, but be even tempered and stable. There 
is a limit to how emotional a pilot can allow himself to be 
towards other pilots, crewmembers and passengers dur-
ing a flight. No one has explicitly told him this, although 
it is an integral part of being a good pilot. The ideal of 
airmanship functions more or less as a cultural “diction-
ary” of how to deal with one’s emotions (Ramvi 2007). In 
the piloting profession, it is the flight operation and pro-
fessional ideology that set the rules for how, where and 
when to cope with your feelings. The individual crew-
member has to feel his way through and decide for him-
self what these limits are, because no one gives the pilots 
any training in adequately displaying their feelings or the 
right way to conduct themselves, whether it be as an air-
man or crew member. It is an individual task to learn the 
more or less unspoken rules of conduct, and if the indi-
vidual pilot does not have this relational capability, he or 
she must learn it. As a result, pilots must be in an exper-
iential cycle and continuously evaluate and re-evaluate 
the ways in which they construct emotional experiences, 
and “perform” their emotions in ways that are accept-
able within everyday life in the cockpit and crew envir-
onment within the specific airline they work for as well 
as within pilot culture in general. This operative rule is so 
strong that it can easily reveal feelings of fear or anxiety 
in terms of not being able to live up to the task at hand. 
Moreover, this emotional competence is an important 
selection criterion for being hired as a pilot in the first 
place in addition to being a fundamental prerequisite for 
being upgraded from a First Officer to Commander.
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4. The day the patient died in the cabin
A Senior Captain (43 years old, 12 000 hrs total flight 
hours, 10 years’ experience in Air Ambulance service) in 
a Scandinavian air ambulance operation told me a story 
about a flight that in retrospect had put him in a posi-
tion of learning from experience due to the post-flight 
debrief: The pilot’s story illustrated the challenging pos-
ition of having to manage being a pilot and experiencing 
painful emotions:
“It started out as an ordinary ambulance flight 
around ten o’clock in the evening. The weather at the des-
tination was below the minimum so our coordination 
centre decided to take the patient by car or fly to another 
hospital. After a few minutes, the plan was again altered 
when they called back with a revised plan to fly the patient 
to another hospital.
Just as we were to depart, the local emergency office 
called us up again and informed us that they had just re-
ceived information about a second patient they wanted us 
to bring to the same hospital. Our flight nurse was negat-
ive about this second patient as she considered his medical 
condition to be too severe to be flown together with the 
first one. After some discussion and a little pressure, she ac-
cepted the idea of having two patients onboard this flight. 
When the second patient was delivered to us, the accom-
panying doctor perceived the patient’s medical condition 
to be so poor that he decided to go along as a precaution.
The takeoff was made about 90 minutes after our 
scramble.
After we reached our cruising altitude, the flight 
nurse came into the cockpit with a part of her seat belt in 
her hand. It had broken off close to the fastening bolt. We 
understood immediately that we had no chance to repair 
this in flight and realised we had a problem: Norwegian 
laws and regulations state that no airplane is to take off 
or land unless all persons aboard are securely fastened by 
seat belts. So there we were – in mid-air and de facto not 
allowed to land the aircraft.
A few minutes later there was another occurrence. 
The second patient died. His heart stopped, and the doc-
tor and nurse were unable to restart it. Patients dying in 
the cabin is a rare occurence, but sometimes the medical 
staff are unable to keep them alive long enough to reach 
our designated hospital. Since our first patient was awake 
and clear minded, we tried to keep him unaware of the 
latest development. So our communication became a little 
“off normal”. In order to solve the problem with the flight 
nurse lacking a seat belt, the nurse was secured by baggage 
ropes fastened to the floor. We reached our destination and 
made a normal landing.
After landing, we tried to convey to our coordination 
centre that we only needed one ambulance to transport the 
patients from the airfield to the local hospital, and not two. 
What we did not know was that neither the coordination 
centre nor the local hospital had been informed that we had 
two patients onboard. They were therefore a bit puzzled by 
our message. Onboard, we had a short discussion to decide 
what to do with the dead body we had in our plane. The 
consensus was that we had to bring the body back with 
us. In order to do so according to regulations, the patient 
had to be brought to the receiving hospital and be declared 
dead before we could transport the body back to the hos-
pital he had originally been transported from. We decided 
to go through with this, as we decided that this was the 
most practical thing to do, both from the operative point of 
view and in consideration of the patient’s next of kin.
A short break was then called for and we refuelled 
the aircraft. As this was late at night, there were no pro-
fessional fuel loaders available. In our air ambulance op-
eration, we fly twenty-four/seven, so it is common that if 
there are no professional fuel loaders available, we fuel 
the aircraft ourselves, which we have been thoroughly 
trained to do. That particular night, I ordered my co-pi-
lot to go and get the fuel truck and to refuel the aircraft at 
the airfield’s fuel facility. Near the completion of the fuel-
ling, he had an unfortunate accident. Due to a technical 
malfunction with the fuelling system, the co-pilot got fuel 
spilled on his face and in both eyes. I instantly informed 
the doctor and nurse who took immediate action. They 
discussed how to best rinse his eyes and check for dam-
age. The nurse was transported to the local hospital to 
obtain adequate medical equipment and chemicals to use 
for treating the co-pilot.
Clearly, due to the fuel accident, the co-pilot could 
not continue his function as a pilot on the return flight 
to our home base. Yet again that night, we had to take a 
mental step back and assess the situation: We had a body 
aboard, and we had a seat without a seat belt. Now we 
were well into the night and we all were starting to feel 
tired. At the same time, we tried to keep our coordination 
centre informed about what we were doing.
To get our plane, the dead body and our co-pilot back 
to our home base, we scrambled a new co-pilot from our 
base at the site. My original co-pilot was now a patient and 
we placed him on a second stretcher onboard the aircraft, 
next to the corpse lying by the first patient. The flight nurse 
had to again be secured by baggage ropes fastened to the 
floor at the back of the cabin. We then performed a normal 
flight home.
After landing at around seven in the morning, we met 
for a short debriefing, though the debriefing we performed 
was nothing more than a short-term decision-making pro-
cess and I took the initiative to postpone it. We were tired 
and perceived ourselves as being too fatigued to perform 
a thorough debriefing. Another decisive factor in our de-
cision to postpone was that we were not in the right mood 
for it. We pointed out to ourselves that through the entire 
trip we had an ever so lighthearted atmosphere. We had 
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smiled and laughed throughout the night. At no time was 
there a shortage of humorous and witty remarks as the 
series of surreal incidents was played out before us. Flying 
home, a hindsight atmosphere closed down around us. In 
a sense, the witty remarks stood in sharp contrast to the 
dead man lying on the stretcher. Instead of just performing 
an operational debriefing there and then and being done 
with it, we agreed to meet later that day for the debriefing. 
We went to bed and slept.
The next day the doctor, nurse, co-pilots and myself 
met for the debriefing. The entire trip from start to finish 
was discussed. Since there were few operative questions, 
the main discussion was on the mental and emotional is-
sues, with the humorous atmosphere as an important star-
ing point. We tried to make a common narrative on what 
we experienced during the whole operation. In this narrat-
ive we also tried to identify what happened when, and who 
said what. Why, and how, did we end up as we did? Did 
we solve our problems in the right way? What could have 
been done differently? How did each of us react to the vari-
ous problems we faced during the night? We took time to 
write down our own separate view on the night and even 
invited the coordination centre to write their version as 
well. The debriefing was thorough; we spent hours letting 
everyone in the crew speak their mind and tell the others 
what their feelings were during the mission as the differ-
ent occurrences took place. After everyone had their turn 
and expressed their feelings and thoughts, we discussed 
the similarities and differences in the emotional reactions 
within the crew.
As it all worked out, we agreed that we did the best 
we could at the time. All participated and contributed to 
solving problems, and all felt informed about our situation 
as it progressed. Hindsight could tell us what we should 
not have done, but we were all quite pleased with how 
we had reacted during the night. As we said in our indi-
vidual writings, the lighthearted atmosphere could partly 
be explained by fatigue. But most of all, in retrospect, we 
explained the atmosphere as being the result of us trying 
to cope with all the problems we faced, with a common 
understanding that we needed cheering up as we worked 
a series of surrealistic events throughout the night . We 
agreed that ethically we could defend our humorous at-
mosphere because our alternative was to sink more and 
more into despair over the course of the night. If we had 
become overwhelmed by our feeling of despair, we could 
not have pulled through the mission. That was not an op-
tion, so we had to pull through. We, therefore, more or less 
had to create an atmosphere that allowed us to process the 
situations at hand and leave us with the capacity to deal 
with the experience. In the debriefing, we also discussed 
that the humorous atmosphere was the opposite of what 
we really felt, though we still had rather the same attitude 
during the debriefing.”
In a follow-up interview, the pilot told me that the 
general rule in the operative pilot culture is that the in-
dividual must have a clear understanding as to what the 
pilot can allow him or herself to feel at any stage of the 
flight. For that reason, pilots must have an emotional 
distance to the feelings evoked in their personal life in 
order to prevent them from entering the professional 
atmosphere in the cockpit. Similarly, it is important to 
have a distance to the feelings evoked in the professional 
setting in order to prevent them from entering personal 
and social settings.
The captain elaborated on this operative standpoint 
by telling me what happened in the cockpit when the 
flight nurse informed the pilots that one of the patients 
had died. The pilot explained that when the flight nurse 
entered the cockpit and informed him that the patient 
was dead, he dealt with the information with a purely op-
erative attitude: “Since it had no operative implications, I 
disregarded the information at the time. We were descend-
ing towards our destination and I had to focus my attention 
on flying the aircraft. I remember my immediate reaction 
and the inner dialogue in my head, saying to myself it was 
a pity that he had died, but he was old and very ill. After 
landing, I felt quite a bit of guilt for not being more em-
phatic. In the follow-up debriefing, we discussed the death 
further and I expressed my feelings of guilt to the rest of the 
crew: no one should have to die in an aircraft. The decision 
to try to move him to another hospital should not have been 
made. He should have been allowed to die in familiar sur-
roundings with his relatives near him. The crew agreed with 
me. Even the doctor and nurses agreed that the decision to 
move the patient from the local hospital to the university 
hospital was disastrous, also from a medical perspective re-
garding the analysis of the medical condition of the patient. 
At the same time, the medical staff, sharing my frustra-
tion, assured me that this patient would have died anyway. 
There was nothing else that could have been done to save 
him, even if he was on the ground in a hospital. That in-
formation helped me, because there was nothing we could 
have done differently. If there had been something that we 
could have done that would have made a difference in the 
outcome, for instance, that we should have used less time 
than we did, then the feeling of guilt would not disappear. 
In the follow-up debriefing, the flight nurse also expressed 
that she felt guilty for not being more assertive towards the 
medical doctors who had taken the decision to move the 
patient. We used a lot of time to share our feelings of guilt. 
But with the crew’s help, our feeling of guilt evaporated in 
the common agreement that we had done the best we could 
in the situation. With each problem that we solved that 
night, we became a tighter crew. We were pleased that we 
had managed to operate in a safe manner and that we had 
succeeded in maintaining a good work atmosphere, despite 
all the problems we faced that night.”
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Another pilot flying in an air ambulance operation 
explained his attitude towards debriefings: “Flying an 
air ambulance, I experience episodes that trigger my per-
sonal and deep emotions on a day to day basis. Meeting 
patients barely hanging on to life often reminds me of my 
own friends and families, and even of my feelings on life 
and death. As a young captain flying in an air ambulance 
operation, I remember a particular flight where I felt I had 
to use my mental capacity in order not to lose my com-
posure. Before the flight, the medical staff operating as our 
cabin attendants briefed us that we were going to be flying 
a young child. Although the operative rule is that we as pi-
lots are not to be informed of the medical conditions of the 
patients we transport due to the fact that this information 
can potentially influence us in a negative way, I instantly 
understood this was not a normal transportation flight. It 
turned out that our passenger was a young boy with ter-
minal cancer. The doctors had given up treating him. All 
hope was gone, and he was being sent home to die. I knew 
when the young boy boarded that this was going to be his 
last flight ever. He was also aware that he was going to die 
soon, but still he showed great courage about his situation. 
The young boy reminded me of my own children and how 
fragile happiness is. Seeing him affected me deeply, but I 
could not let it stand in the way of performing the flight 
safely. I remember this flight very well because when we 
reached our cruising altitude, I remember that I used time 
to reflect on how we as pilots and crew should approach 
the situation when we landed and offloaded the patient: 
How do I say goodbye to a patient leaving the aircraft that 
everyone, including the patient himself, knows is going to 
die within a short period of time? I remember thinking to 
myself that I could not use my standard phrase when we 
were finished offloading the patient. I could not wish him 
good luck and hope for a speedy recovery.
You cannot work in this business without getting 
emotionally involved with the patients we fly. If you never 
become emotionally involved, it is my impression that you 
are unfit to do this job. Debriefings are important to me, 
because in these sessions we discuss emotional matters and 
issues. In a debriefing, you learn why and how emotions 
can surface and the best way to deal with them. In debrief-
ing sessions, we sometimes discuss our own professional 
and personal feelings, which are often dealt with within 
an informal atmosphere. Even though the debriefing plays 
an important role in coping with emotions we experience 
during missions, it can never prevent you from taking 
home some of the emotions it evokes. For most pilots, it 
is difficult to deal with emotions that are evoked during 
flights. In the same way, it is also difficult for pilots to pre-
vent emotions evoked in their personal life from entering 
their job.
In some debriefings, we allow ourselves to be quite 
intimate with one another and share our emotions with 
other crewmembers, either about what is happening in 
our personal lives or about what we experience during the 
flights. Sharing my emotions allows other crewmembers 
to understand and accept my reactions. But sometimes 
the sharing also helps in the way that other crewmembers 
make my emotions bearable to me. To me, a debriefing is 
not a question of the formal setting; it is more a question of 
togetherness within a crew.”
5. Learning from experience – a psychoanalytical 
perspective
Bion (1962) offers an approach to understand how air-
manship evolves and is maintained as a result of pilots 
learning from their experiences through post-flight de-
briefings. In the following, I will concentrate on the role 
of post-flight debriefing as one of the most important 
institutional ways of learning airmanship and maintain-
ing a professional attitude in aviation.
The psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion (1897–1979) 
claimed that developing skills and competence in doing 
something is intimately related to the evolvement of a 
specific awareness. To Bion, gaining a piece of particu-
lar knowledge is equal to learning from our emotional 
experiences. We learn to deal with emotions in the same 
way we learn a particular set of skills. Bion is known for 
his work on group dynamics. His theory of thinking is 
interesting for acquiring an understanding about the de-
velopment of competence among aviation pilots.
Bion (1961) is concerned with two parallel develop-
mental learning processes: a developmental process he 
refers to as “K” and an anti-developmental process re-
ferred to as “–K”.
In both, emotions and skills are pieced together. 
Learning in a positive mode leads to progression in the 
learning process, but when skills and emotions are linked 
in a negative mode it leads to regression. It is impossible 
to distinguish between emotion and reflection says Bion.
The link of emotion to expression and expression to 
emotion is essential for thinking (Bion 1962). Thinking 
is, in an emotional sense, a continuous transformation 
of turning the “raw material” of feelings into emotional 
experiences, which irrevocably changes the thinker and 
his or her perception of inner and outer reality.
Bion perceived emotional development and learn-
ing a skill as parallel processes. Learning a skill and emo-
tional development take place in the same way. Never-
theless, he also acknowledged how these processes were 
closely intertwined with one another. The crucial point 
in deciding whether a person is capable of dealing with 
a (practical) situation that results in a positive develop-
mental learning process or an opposite, anti-develop-
mental, is in itself emotional. The person’s capability to 
cope with emotional uncertainty and mental pain exists 
until it is possible to link the situation to a conscious 
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thought. If a person does not manage this uncertainty, 
the potential learning becomes denied by an emotional 
defence mechanism, thereby becoming unavailable for 
conscious reflection. The potential “thought out action” 
will therefore be lost and will have the opposite effect, as 
an unconscious emotion in which the individual exper-
iences a fear of feeling. Thus this process of anti-devel-
opment results in a process of repetition and stagnation 
(Ramvi 2007; Ramvi, Roland 1998).
6. The post-flight debrief
In contrast to many other professions, the aviation com-
munities have formal procedures with the motive of 
developing a pilot’s competence and helping pilots and 
crewmembers with their everyday social interaction and 
managing their feelings.
After every flight, pilots and crewmembers are in 
principle obligated by law to have a post-operative de-
briefing and to submit a retrospective report to the com-
pany according to the EU OPS 1.085b, EU OPS 1.037(a) 
(2), Appendix 1 to EU OPS 1.1045 Operations Manual 
contents, Annex 6 to the Convention in International 
Civil Aviation, Part I, paragraphs 3.2.3. and 3.2.4. (Com-
mission Regulation... 2008).
On a daily basis, all of the members of the flight 
crew have some sort of assembled gathering after every 
flight to ensure that none of the crewmembers have ex-
perienced anything unusual during the flight. An ex-
perienced captain explained post-flight debriefings in 
the following way: “After each flight, the crew gathers in 
the crew office. We report to the company on the status of 
the crew and the aircraft. After doing so, we spend a few 
minutes evaluating the flight. Normally the operative de-
briefing is straightforward and amounts to declaring that 
everything went according to normal operations. Occa-
sionally, we need time to work through specific events that 
occurred during the flight, either in the cockpit or in the 
cabin. The debriefing will then continue to its conclusion 
with no regard to time. Sometimes we submit a written re-
port to our superiors because the nature of the event legally 
demands us to report it. In the majority of cases, we report 
events that we as a crew have handled in a good manner as 
well as when we have handled a situation poorly. We hand 
in a written report because we feel the event had elements 
that other crews can learn from, helping them to be able 
to handle a situation similar to ours differently or better” 
(interview 2010).
The function of the post-flight debriefing is to have 
a group level meeting where all the crewmembers carry 
out a review after the flight or sortie of events or pro-
cedures during the flight. First and foremost, the post-
flight debriefings are an institutionalized instrument to 
improve safety as well as enhance the competence of an 
individual crewmember (Baker, Key Dismukes 2002; 
Dismukes, Smith 2000). In order to enhance individual 
competence, post-flight debriefings serve a dual func-
tion: as a setting that evokes thinking in Bion’s terms in 
addition to allowing pilots and crewmembers to learn 
from their experience in an emotional sense. In one in-
terview, an experienced captain reflected on the import-
ance of post-operative debriefings: “In a debriefing you 
learn what and how emotions can surface and the best 
way to deal with them” (interview 2010).
The importance of debriefings is a topic under 
dispute (Everly, Mitchell 2005). Nevertheless, Bartone 
(2006) characterizes post-flight debriefings as an after 
action group event which when properly timed and 
conducted with a correct focus can have a great thera-
peutic value for many participants. By helping pilots and 
crewmembers to place potentially traumatizing events in 
a broader context of positive meaning, debriefings will 
have positive individual as well as collective effects in 
terms of hardiness and resilience (Stueland 2006).
7. Learning airmanship through experience – an 
analysis of the importance of debriefings
Within the aviation community, there is an overwhelm-
ing understanding of the importance of the individual 
learning from his or her own experience. Characterizing 
a good airman, it is said that an individual must have: 
“The attitude and eagerness to always want to learn more 
and have a well thought through understanding of what 
you have going on in your life”, as stated by a chief pilot 
(interview 2006).
Through the post-operative debriefing, pilots learn 
from their experience. The debriefing is part of an ever-
lasting learning process in which the pilot learns to act in 
a well thought out manner in Bions terms, as opposed to 
conducting a flight operation on impulse or in a thinking 
avoidance mode.
In order to learn from one’s own experience, there is 
a common perception that a pilot must share his or her 
experience with others. In aviation, it is not only a ques-
tion whether the individual learns from his or her own 
experience. It is also just as important to question how 
the crew as a whole has learned from their experience. 
A modern flight operation consists of several reciprocal 
actions which demand that several people work together. 
Consequently, we cannot distinguish between individual 
and group learning.
Within pilot culture, the debriefing serves as an in-
stitutionalized alpha function in which individual emo-
tional experiences are transformed to collective exper-
iences (Bion 1962; Benjamin 1991). In debriefings, the 
individual pilot can make use of existing cultural nar-
ratives such as occurrence and accident reports which 
formulate the individual’s emotions and provide the 
individual with meaningful explanations as to what he 
or she experiences during the flight. By sharing one’s 
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experiences with others through culturally specific nar-
ratives, other pilots’ experiences can help the individual 
to bear his/her experience. Through narrating one’s ex-
perience, the individual opens up an opportunity for 
other pilots and crewmembers to learn from the same 
experience as if they had been there, while in return, he 
or she can learn from others’ experience as if he or she 
had been there. In that way, the individual experience 
opens up for the opposite – learning from others’ exper-
ience: “When I read incident and accident reports, I try 
to imagine myself being in the same situation. I picture 
myself being in the same cockpit and try to imagine how 
I would react and deal with the matters at hand. When 
I read or hear people telling about other occurrences 
and accidents, I always question whether I would have 
done the same thing as the pilot and crew in question, 
or whether I would have reacted differently, knowing my 
level of skills and level of competence.”
In post-flight debriefings, pilots and crewmembers 
are able to “let off steam” together with others who are 
relationally at the same level. Debriefings are particularly 
important after difficult, frustrating, stressful and pain-
ful experiences.
Debriefings are sometimes only a chance for crew-
members to exchange small stories over which they 
shake their heads and laugh, which was also the case in 
this situation. During the flight, the crew was laughing 
and trying to make the best out of the situation. By con-
ducting a debriefing instantly after landing, the crew also 
did what they should legally.
Why was it was so important for the pilot and crew 
to perform a second debriefing? The crew could easily 
have conducted a short debriefing session in accordance 
with what was legally demanded of them and report the 
irregularities that occurred during the event (i.e. the lack 
of communication of the second patient, reporting to the 
technical department about the seat belt incident, etc.). 
Was the decision to perform a second debriefing a result 
of that it was the most convenient thing to do, given the 
fact that it was late at night and the crew was fatigued? 
Or could the decision to perform a second debriefing be 
understood as a prolonging of the need to follow the un-
written rules of good airmanship and that the crew felt 
the need to take time in dealing with the raw material 
of experiences and emotions evoked through the flight?
A pilot must be able to contain his feelings, and we 
can also claim that he possibly has an unconscious need 
to deal with them.
In psychoanalytical terms, the pilot must control his 
feelings during the flight operation. He has to struggle 
with coping with the emotions in order to follow the op-
erative rules and not lose his composure. In other words, 
he has to display feelings differently from what he has 
actually experienced.
Considering the analysis of this case study, we can 
say that the pilot acknowledged his feelings during the 
event. In the interview, he reported that during the flight 
he experienced feelings of helplessness, feelings of mor-
tality, feelings of ignorance or a fear of being out of con-
trol. With his initiative to do a follow-up debriefing, the 
pilot had the possibility to take a psychological step back 
and relate to the experience in a more mature manner. Ac-
cording to Bion (1962), relating in a mature way requires 
working with thoughts about feelings. Through his own 
effort and with the help of others in the crew, he could 
deal with the emotions he experienced through the course 
of events. Through other crewmember’s projective identi-
fication, the pilot was able to distinguish between what is 
to be learned from the experience and what were his indi-
vidual emotions during the event. Due to the ideals of air-
manship and through his day to day experiences with fly-
ing patients, the pilot is in a constant emotional learning 
process which changes him and the social environment 
that he is part of. In turn, this means that the next emo-
tional experience will potentially be easier to understand 
and give him the possibility of acting differently and more 
in accordance with the ideals of airmanship.
The point I am trying to make here is whether it was 
only his striving to follow the rules of professionalism 
that urged him to do the follow-up debriefing? During 
the event, he had to hold his feelings in check. Through 
the pilot and other crewmembers’ ability to project and 
identify their feelings during the debriefing, the pilot was 
able to observe his feelings and compare them with those 
of the other crewmembers and reflect on them. On an 
individual level, the pilot could have felt a long-term risk 
of experiencing a feeling of fear or anxiety as a result of 
not dealing with the emotions he experienced during the 
trip. In other words, there were at least two motivations: 
the fear of not being able to live up to the ideal of airman-
ship, and even more so, potentially losing touch with his 
feelings.
In Bion’s theory, the debriefing created an (emo-
tional) experience and thereby a thought out action, 
rather than acting as if possessing knowledge and run-
ning the long-term risk of losing control and not being 
able to keep their cool the next time a similar situation 
presents itself. To think and reflect about his feelings by 
putting them into words makes it possible for him to 
take responsibility for them.
Tolerance or the ability to bear pain demands cour-
age (Lear 2009) as well as emotional support through oth-
ers’ projective identification (Greenberg, Mitchell 1983). 
If these factors are not in place, an omnipotence relating 
to emotions may be used as a defence mechanism. The 
use of this defence mechanism would be challenging for 
individual thinking (–K) and have anti-development as 
a potential outcome.
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The element of containment in the colleagues’ way of 
sharing stories with each other creates a good condition 
for learning from experience. The post-flight debriefing 
opens for a sense of conjunction between what the pilot 
feels and the relief of not having to simulate feelings. Bion 
(1961) described how certain types of groups learn from 
experience, and labelled these types of groups literally as 
the W-group (Work group). The group who learns from 
experience is characterized by K activities. Within the 
group, there is a climate in which diversity in opinions is 
allowed and appreciated. This type of climate is develop-
ment in itself, Bion claimed. Nevertheless, such a group 
climate is dependent on a tolerance for one another and 
the fact that different opinions can be put forward without 
giving one opinion moral priority over another.
In contrast, the group functioning in a manner con-
tradictory to a learning group environment is character-
ized by –K activities. Bion described this type of group 
interaction as he labelled it. The interaction is based 
on the individual’s Basic Assumptions (BA-group). All 
group members share an unspoken and unconscious 
agreement that a work task can be resolved without any 
effort, without thinking and learning. “There is a hatred 
of having to learn by experience at all and lack of faith 
in the worth of such kind of learning” (Bion 1961: 89). 
The group, therefore, acts “as if ” their basic assumptions 
are real.
While there is good connection with reality at the 
W-group level, the BA-group is irrational and out of con-
tact with reality. Even so, the team spirit and relation-
ships at the BA-group level can thrive in a seductive way.
More than anything, the follow-up debriefing 
demonstrated a W-group mentality. By literally letting 
each other sleep on it, they met again the following day 
and performed a debriefing in which the idea was to in-
form each other about the difficult emotions the events 
evoked. The general idea was that the individually ex-
perienced painful emotions would evaporate by sharing 
them with the same people they shared the experience 
with. The emotions that emerged as a result of the flight 
did not become an individual matter, and the crewmem-
bers were not allowed to deal with the emotions alone, 
or had to deal with them with others, i.e. family mem-
bers and others who would have a totally different start-
ing point for projective identification simply because 
they were not there and did not see all the details and 
sense the atmosphere. The pilots and other crewmem-
bers evolved and developed (K) as individuals and crew 
(W-group) because they talked together seriously and 
shared the individual worries, painful emotions and 
frustrations they experienced.
Learning from experience is about having the capab-
ility to contain one’s feelings, taking responsibility for hav-
ing them, how one passes them on, and not denying them.
To be able to learn from experience, pilots must be 
able to contain their own fear of feeling ignorant and 
helpless. Nevertheless, the pilot’s main conclusion after 
telling me his story is that the debriefing helped him to 
see and understand his own emotional reaction as this 
was important to him.
By being a good crewmember and making an ef-
fort to create a K environment, or a holding environment 
within the crew in Winnicott’s term (1972), not only 
puts the pilot in a position that enables him to help other 
crewmembers to contain their emotions, but also consti-
tutes a condition to contain his own feelings and his own 
learning from experience.
8. Conclusive remarks: the role of debriefing
In this paper, I wanted to explore an actual incident 
in aviation. I have tried to relate Bion’s concepts to a 
pilot’s everyday life, particularly to a situation that in-
volved strong emotions, as well as situations that require 
crewmembers to contain their feelings. The story about 
the special flight is, therefore, not only a story about a 
particular flight. The emotional challenges pilots are ex-
posed to requires them to accept the potential pain of 
knowing (+K) and to be able to think about their own 
difficult feelings. This process of containing instead of 
having omnipotent control may present a great deal of 
anxiety, but according to Bion this may be the beginning 
of learning from one’s own experiences.
The pilots’ need to control their emotions and 
learning from experience have a double rationale. The 
pilot’s story of the unusual flight highlights the many 
obstacles that appeared when he and his colleagues were 
exposed to events that evoked strong emotions. The op-
erative situation enabled the crew to act as containers for 
emotions aroused both in themselves and in other crew-
members during the flight. They recognized each other, 
and the use of humour functioned as a common denial 
of their emotional experience until they were able to sit 
down and deal with the strong emotions they were ex-
posed to. The crew distanced themselves from a surreal 
situation by omnipotent relating to avoid pain. In order 
to learn from experience, the pilots and crew had to deal 
with them in the debriefing. The post-flight debriefing 
helped the crew to maintain relationships and deal with 
the individual pain and their fear of ignorance. In this 
sense, the post-operative debriefing has a therapeutic 
function that allowed room for reconciliation between 
the pilots’ ideal and the meeting of reality. With regard 
to many other professions, it seems as if aviation does, 
ideally speaking, not leave it to the individual to process 
emotions and their vulnerability.
From a psychoanalytical perspective, a pilot’s idea 
of airmanship is knowing when to do what, when to con-
tain and when to use defence mechanisms in order to 
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deal with an operative situation that demands their full 
attention. Consequently, airmanship is not only about 
the knowledge of flying aircraft, it is also an emotional 
and relational skill (Eid et al. 2008).
The role of the post-operative debriefing, therefore, 
has a double meaning by helping the individual as well 
as the group to create an emotional distance to the event, 
allowing participants to deal with what really took place 
during it. Creating distance to the event by distancing 
the emotions it creates allows for long-term distancing 
from the event to deal with the feelings created.
The reflections in this article are in accordance 
with research on the effects of debriefing: When prop-
erly timed and conducted with a focus on events rather 
than emotions and reactions, post-operative debriefings 
can have a great therapeutic value for many of the parti-
cipants by helping them to place potentially traumatizing 
events in a broader context of positive meaning that will 
yield positive individual and collective effects regarding 
hardiness and resilience (Bartone 2006; Johansen et al. 
2005, Eid et al. 2005 ).
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